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GORDONB. BALDWIN 
AESTRACT 
INTHIS ARTICLE, THE LIBRARYBILLOF RIGHTSwill be viewed with both interest 
and skepticism. It will be argued that it promises more than it can de- 
liver, and that in many respects it does not follow existing First Amend- 
ment doctrine. Law allows considerable freedom of choice and usually 
reaffirms the discretion of school and library administrators. The law, 
moreover, allows the imposition of large burdens upon the young; the 
Library Bill of Rights suggests otherwise. 
A year ago, Wayne Wiegand of Wisconsin’s Library School asked me 
to review the Library Bill of Rights as a lawyer. My first impression re- 
mains. Its vague, wooly, and ambiguous language promises more than 
anyone can deliver, and its commands do not equate with law. It also has 
gaps. For example, the Library Bill of Rights fails to note that the incul- 
cation of values is a major purpose of an educational enterprise. 
Within the Library Bill of Rights was found several themes creating 
tensions, if not contradictions, limiting its persuasive force. First, it re- 
flects, in unspecific terms, an uncertain commitment rooted in our cul- 
ture and history to intellectual freedom; second, it embodies the inter- 
ests of librarians in resisting outside interference with their work; and 
third, it embodies only a few protections found in the First and Four- 
teenth Amendments to the U. s. Constitution. 
The Library Bill of Rights cannot codify either First Amendment law 
or all interests of librarians for several reasons. First, law does not ad- 
dress all the policies forcibly and persistently advanced by the American 
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Library Association. Second, many free speech questions remain unclear 
because there is no general and agreed upon theory of the purpose of the 
First Amendment. Third, many issues-such as book selection decisions- 
evade court review and therefore never receive authoritative judicial review. 
Even if the Library Bill of Rights codified the law, it would generate criticism 
because no one unqualifiedly supports the First Amendment as the Supreme 
Court interpret? it. Some say the United States unnecessarily protects more 
speech than any other nation or society; others stress the subjectivity and, 
hence, unpredictability of modern doctrine. No one claims we have a fault- 
less interpretation of the First Amendment. 
The Library Bill of Rights ignores the market forces that create the re- 
sources in collections. Decisions of publishers and authors rest on their 
values, interests, and judgment, which reflect differing degrees of subjectiv-
ity if not self-censorship. Librarians cannot obtain what producers decide 
not to write or not to publish. The Library Bill of Rights extolls the virtues of 
diversity but, for diversity of opinion, the public depends upon diverse and 
competing producers. Market forces limit variety. If a few large publishers 
and national bookstore chains dominate the market, the public cannot find 
the diversity of opinion that the Library Bill of Rights invites. 
Law allows self-censorship. We cannot assume that everything valuable 
will find a publisher. Indeed we have evidence that educated audiences as 
well as publishers shun offensive material. Amy Hielsherg (1994), a Univer- 
sity of Wisconsin-Madison School of Library and Information Studies stu- 
dent, recently revealed the sensitivities of her peers who objected to a read- 
ing of an allegedly sexist novel, Amprican Psycho by Bret Easton Ellis (1991). 
The book provoked the anger of the Los Angeles Chapter of the National 
Organization of Women (among others) (Heilsberg, 1994, p. 768). Ellis 
had difficulty in finding a publisher for this work, described by a British 
writer as a work of sexual violence published under the guise of social com- 
mentary (Gardner, 1994). Hielsberg reports the anger of her classmates 
when she read portions of the novel describing the mutilation of women. 
She notes that, although the book occupied the best-seller list for weeks, 
OCLC records show that only 417 American libraries purchased it. In this 
incident, Hielsberg finds self-censorship and conflict with the Library Bill of 
Rights. She observes that the Library Bill of Rights does not guide the prac- 
tices of many (if not most) book selectors, and that self-censorship exists 
after publicationjust as it does before. 
Self-censorship dominates the decisions of textbook publishers. If 
textbook publishers want to sell hundreds of thousands of history books 
to California or Texas schools, they must satisfy state reviewers whose de- 
cisions can rest on the fashions of the moment. History and government 
texts in the public schools appear bland in their avoidance of contro- 
versy. A text written in 1940 may record an 1890 event much differently 
than a text written in 1990. “The great tides and currents which engulf 
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the rest of men,” Benjamin Cardozo said in 1921, “do not turn in their 
course and pass the [educators] by.” Lines between censorship and judg- 
ment appear blurred. Self-censorship remains; the law permits it and 
good manners reinforce it, even if the Library Bill of Rights does not. 
Contracts, or their equivalent, control access. The Library Bill of 
Rights does not forbid libraries from limiting access to patrons based on 
employment, residence, or membership in the group for whom the li- 
brary exists,’ nor does the Library Bill of Rights touch on contractual 
limitations that donors commonly attach. When Joseph Rauh, a promi- 
nent civil rights lawyer, donated his personal papers to the Library of 
Congress, he required a reader to obtain his consent if they wished to 
publish (Kaplan, 1988). Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger deeded 
his notes to the Library of Congress, but he insisted on retaining power 
to control access (Kissinger u.Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press, 
1980). In contrast, Justice Thurgood Marshall’s files held by the Library 
of Congress are available to “serious scholars,” and the library broadly 
confers that status. The Library Bill of Rights does not purport to confer 
rights on library users but, even if it did, courts commonly decline to find 
a legal interest violated merely because a library declines to follow its 
own policies (Boothe u. Hammock, 1979; Frison u. Franklin County Board of 
Education, 1979; Cofone ‘u. Manson, 1979). 
The law-but not the Library Bill of Rights-draws a distinction be- 
tween government and private action. The First Amendment only limits 
government. Private groups and individuals can, and regularly do, for- 
bid speech. Thus a church can expel a member because of his or her 
speech and opinions; private schools may punish their students and their 
employees because of their speech; other private associations remain free 
from constitutional restraints. Therefore, the Auxiliary Bishop of St. Paul 
committed no constitutional violation when he ordered birth control 
advocate Margaret Sanger’s picture removed from the University of St. 
Thomas library in 1993. The modest book removal limitations appli- 
cable to public schools do not apply to private schools, colleges, and li- 
braries. Distinctions between private and state action rest more on his- 
tory, tradition, and on policy preferences than on logic. 
The recent Hurley decision illustrates a command to honor private 
choice. The St. Patricks-Evacuation Day parade, a regular and treasured 
event in Boston, looks very public because as many as 20,000 marchers 
and a million viewers celebrate the city’s Irish heritage and the British 
retreat in 1776. A state court ruled that its organizers, the South Boston 
Allied Veterans Council, could not bar a gay/lesbian group from partici- 
pating because Massachusetts law forbids even private discrimination based 
on sexual orientation. However, the Supreme Court unanimously re- 
versed that decision in 1995, saying that the First Amendment forbade 
government from forcing the veterans to give a place to the gay/lesbian 
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marchers (Hurley u. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Bos-
ton, 1995). “The state court’s application of the statute had the effect of 
declaring the sponsor’s speech itself to be the public accommodation.” 
The Court ruled that “this use of the State’s power violates the funda- 
mental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has 
the autonomy to choose the content of his own message” ( H u r l q  u. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 1995). State law can- 
not force the Veterans Council to carry a message it disapproved of be- 
cause “parades are...a form of expression, notjust motion” ( H u r l 9  u. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 1995). Thus, the Su- 
preme Court ratified the right of a group to make private choices. 
Law limits what government can demand. Law cannot require news- 
papers to publish a reply to a critical article (Miami Herald u. Tornillo, 
1974), and a corporation cannot be forced to distribute critical advertise- 
ments (Pacific Gas &Electric Co. u. Public Utilities Commission, 1986). On 
the other hand, courts appear more willing to tolerate government com- 
mands upon the electronic media, including cable Tv. 
Private premises enjoy immunity from constitutional control but remain 
subject to reasonable public regulation (Pruneyard Shopping Center u. Robbins, 
1980). However, if the private group organizes itself to become a “place of 
public accommodation,” it becomes subject to regulations banning discrimi- 
natory behavior. Identifylng such a place presents difficulties, and large un- 
certain grey areas exist. The Supreme Court has ruled that Rotary Clubs 
(Board of Directms .fRotary Club International u. Rotary Club o f  Duarte, 198’7), 
the Jaycees (Roberts u. United States Jaycees, 1984), and other large clubs (New 
Ywk State Club Assoc., Inc. u. The City of New Erk, 1988) having open member- 
ship policies qualify as places of public accommodation and cannot engage 
in gender discrimination, but the South Boston Allied Veterans Council, the 
court rules, differs. It appears, therefore, that a library in a religious school 
might limit access to believers. 
Where a public library offers rooms for meetings, it usually follows 
that the library supplies a “limited place of public accommodation” and 
its power to restrict access becomes qualified by the command to avoid 
invidious discrimination. Must libraries open their facilities to “all” as 
the Library Bill of Rights promises? What if the request for a meeting 
room comes from a group such as NAMBLA (the North American Man- 
Boy Love Association)? A library might resist offering a meeting place to 
a group advocating, if not practicing, violation of law, but paragraph six 
of the Library Bill of Rights suggests otherwise. 
Lambs Chapel u. CenterMoriches Union Free SchoolDist. (1993)and Widmar 
u. Vincent (1981) underscore the open access rule. These decisions hold 
that if access to facilities are given to groups generally, access cannot be 
denied simply because users engage in religious activities. All religious 
activities? What if a religious group in which animal sacrifices play a 
significant role seeks to use the library meeting rooms? The Constitu- 
tion would probably not forbid a library rule prohibiting animal sacri- 
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fices on its premises (Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. u.City of Hi-
aleah, 1993), but it is very doubtful that library rules could constitution- 
ally forbid a Mass or a communion service in their meeting rooms if it 
permitted other groups to worship. 
Law allows libraries room to regulate access. In 1992, the U. S. Court 
of Appeals in Philadelphia ruled that the public library of Morristown, 
New Jersey, could exclude a homeless man who loitered in the facility 
and whose “odor was often so offensive that it prevented the library pa- 
trons from using certain areas of the Library” (Kreimeru. Bureau of Police 
for Town of Morristown, 1992). The Court of Appeals reversed a radical 
decision by a district judge who had held that the library rules were too 
vague and allowed the library staff too much discretion. The decision 
reversing the lower court embodies several critical points. 
The Court found that library rules implied “a right to receive infor- 
mation” based on the First Amendment. Then the Court added another, 
and more problematic, observation saying that the First Amendment “ad- 
ditionally encompasses the positive right of public access to information 
and ideas” (Kreimeru. Bureau of Policefor Town of Morristown, 1992). The 
Court gave careful attention to the rules and rationale resulting in the 
library’s exclusion of Kreimer, a homeless man and not a serious book 
lover, who used the library merely as a shelter. The District Court found 
this use permissable, but the Court of Appeals wisely disagreed and ruled 
that access to the library might be limited to fulfill the purposes for which 
the library exists-namely, for communicating written words. Libraries 
are not like parks 01sidewalks, where speech enjoys the greatest protec- 
tion. As a designated (not open) public forum, a library need not be 
open to the public at large but may be opened only for those who abide 
by the library’s reasonable rules. 
A public library may decide to restrict users to residents and even 
require a fee as a prerequisite. Courts uphold reasonable fees as a condi- 
tion to file for bankruptcy, or to appeal a civil judgment, or to seek elec- 
tion to public office, but libraries do not qualify as an essential public 
service to which indigents have a right without cost. 
In examining the library’s rules, the Court applied a reasonableness 
test and concluded that, because the rules fostered a quiet and orderly 
atmosphere conducive to every patron’s exercise of the right to receive 
and read written communication, they passed. The Kreimer decision 
vindicates the exercise of wise discretion by library administrators. That 
discretion, however, must rest on principles of equality. The Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit, upholding the right of a library to exclude 
an unruly patron, says ( Wayfield u. Town of Tisbury, 1994): 
[While a] State or its instrumentality may, of course, regulate the 
use of its libraries or other public facilities ... it must do so in a rea- 
sonable and nondiscriminatory manner, equally applicable to all and 
administered with equality to all....And it may not invoke regulations 
as to use-whether they are ad hoc or general-as a pretext for 
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pursuing those engaged in lawful, constitutionally protected exer- 
cise of their fundamental rights. (citing Brown v. Louisiana, 1966) 
AJune 1995 decision of the U. S. Supreme Court confirms the equal- 
ity dimension of First Amendment law in holding that, if a public univer- 
sity funds student groups, the university may not deny access to those 
funds simply because the group has a religious purpose (Rosenberger u. 
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virpnia, 1995). If a student activity 
fund helps organizations that promote study of Islam or Judaism, school 
authorities may not refuse grants to a Christian group. Rosenberger 
emphasizes equality in saying that the school cannot deny assistance by 
claiming that assistance would violate the First Amendment’s prohibition 
against establishing a religion. 
This 5 - 4 Establishment Clause decision calls for a review of state univer- 
sity policies on funding student extracurricular activities (Rosenbmgmu.Rector 
and Visitors ofthe University o f  Virginia,1995). The decision also invites analy- 
sis of a hypothetical situation. Assume a campus group buys books that it 
intends to gwe to the campus library “to counteract the theological liberal- 
ism, and the anti-religious bias that permeates this campus.” Assume also 
that the college makes small bloc grants to campus organizations to enable 
each to operate. Can the college refuse to give money to an organization 
with a religous purpose? The Rosenberger decision says it may not. Per-
haps the college can decline to allow its funds for all book buying. That 
policy passes because a book ban applies to all. 
A public library book selection policy that broadly rejects inclusion 
of “theological texts, treatises, or tracts” (Rosenbergeru. Rector and Visitors of 
the University of Virginia, 1995) faces a Constitutional challenge under the 
reasoning of Rosenberger However, the book selectors ought to be able to 
select books of interest to patrons. If so, the policy, as applied, would be 
consistent with a policy to stock books of interest to patrons and, although 
vulnerable under a strict reading of Rosenberger, would not violate the 
Library Bill of Rights. Since Rosenberger involves spending public money, 
it stands as a unique example of the Constitution requiring government 
funding of religious activities. The Supreme Court recognized and re-
jected a distinction between government funding and government giving 
access to facilities. The decision may signal a major and needed shift in 
Establishment Clause doctrine (Choper, 1995). 
Commonplace and necessary removal of books from libraries makes 
the American Library Association nervous, reports the Orlando Sentinel 
Ti-ibune on July 21,1991. The paper recounts the removal of library books 
based on racial, ethnic, and sex biases. Should librarians remove books 
because they portray only women as nurses or because they use the male 
pronoun in referring to police and fire fighters? If libraries consistently 
follow the policy of avoiding gender stereotypes, then libraries should 
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not shelve a Bible calling God “he.” However, Courts will not forbid the 
sifting and winnowing of collections based on taste and judgment, be- 
cause judges must not substitute their own subjective views for those of 
others. Books obviously become dated, and that ground alone justifies 
removal without violating any principle in the Library Bill of Rights. 
However, when libraries remove books because of “lacking educational 
value,” the rationale may only mask more insidious purposes. Occasion-
ally, but rarely, book removal decisions receive judicial review. Delcurpio 
versus St. Tarnmuny Parish School Board (1994), for example, presents li- 
brarians with a victory, although only in a lower federal court in Louisi- 
ana. Whether the Supreme Court of the United States would approve 
appears less certain. 
in Delcurpio, the District Court ruled that a school board decision to 
remove books containing detailed descriptions of voodoo spells violated 
the First Amendment and also the Constitution of Louisiana. By relying 
on the Louisiana Constitution, the Court guarded against Supreme Court 
review (because Michigan v. Long, 1983 lets decisions resting on state 
grounds to stand unless the decision violates constitutional standards). 
The story behind the decision is quite simple. The board removed a 
book from its libraries by Jim Haskins (1978) entitled Voodoo & Hoodoo. 
The book traces the development of tribal religion in Africa and describes 
its transfer to African-American communities in America, including Loui- 
siana. About 97 of its 218 pages are devoted to graphic (and, to the 
board, rebarbative) descriptions of common voodoo “spells” or practices 
which the author included to preserve the folklore and knowledge. A 
petition containing 1,600 signatures claimed the practices grossly offen- 
sive, which they doubtless were to most eyes. A school committee de- 
clined to remove the book because it served an educational purpose and 
supplied information on a topic included in the eighth grade curricu- 
lum. However, after extensive discussion, the school board decided to 
remove the book by a 12  to 2 vote because they feared a reader might 
follow the recipes. Several parents, on behalf of their children, chal- 
lenged that removal in federal court, and they prevailed. 
The District Court rejected the school board’s defense that their de- 
cision rested on a discretionary curricular judgment. The record belied 
that claim, the Court found, because opposition to the book rested on its 
contents and on a belief that the ideas in the book conflicted with the 
board’s religious beliefs. The board’s motivation and its purpose to pro- 
mote their personal religious views flunked the constitutional test of neu-
trality. Depositions taken from school board members and from the min- 
utes of their meeting clearly showed the religious motivations behind the 
removal. Disapproval of the book alone might not have mattered. i t  did 
matter that notions of Christianity drove their decision. Thus the District 
Court viewed the board action as fatal not merely because of animosity 
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toward ideas, but because the board evinced a fatal favoritism for particu- 
lar political, social, and moral ideas. However, most school boards could 
dress their policies in tolerable neutral language to allow the removal. 
The Court noted several important features in the removal decision. 
First, the school board removed the whole book. The board did not 
simply restrict circulation to “the younger students whose safety the Board 
purported to be concerned with” (Drlcarpio u.St. Tammany Parish School 
Board, 1994). Nor did the school relegate the book to a reserve shelf 
where children could read it with parental consent. The driving force 
underlying the decision rested on finding an official effort to promote a 
particular idea by excluding the competition. Second, flaws marked the 
board’s decision making. Six members of the board had read only ex- 
cerpts supplied by protestors and not the entire book, thus the board 
acted ignorantly. Third, the actions appeared greater than any risk of 
danger warranted. No evidence showed that any student sought to repli-
cate the voodoo spells. 
Perhaps lawyers for the school board erred in arguing on appeal that 
the book should be considered “pervasively vulgar.” The Court found 
little basis for that conclusion because nothing in the record suggested 
that vulgarity formed the basis for the board decision, and the offensive 
portions hardly pervaded the entire volume. 
Lawyers served the successful Delrarpio plaintiffs well. They had pre- 
pared a record clearly proving that the motivation for the removal deci- 
sion rested on an impermissible wish to deny access to particular ideas 
because of the beliefs of the board members. What if they had only fo- 
cused on the claim of vulgarity? Other removal decisions may not prove 
so easy to contest because, as the Supreme Court stated in the leading 
case of Cohen versus California (1971), “the Constitution leaves matters of 
taste and style ...largely to the individual.” 
Delcnrpio differs from another relevant, but important, decision ren- 
dered fifteen years earlier. In 1980, the 7th Circuit Court upheld admin- 
istrative book selection policies in dismissing a complaint that a school 
removed books expressing feminist viewpoints from its teaching program 
(Zykan u.Warsaw Community School Corp., 1980). The case involved the 
selection of teaching materials, not merely a review of library collection 
policy. The 7th Circuit Court panel found insufficient an allegation that 
the removal rested on the school board’s social, political, and moral tastes. 
If the plaintiff argued that the board was “guided by an interest in impos- 
ing some religious or scientific orthodoxy” or sought to “eliminate a par- 
ticular kind of inquiry” the result would be different (Zykan u.Warsaw 
Community School Corp., 1980). No legal violation occurred because femi- 
nist ideas were otherwise available. As of this writing, the decision stands 
as the law in Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana. It illustrates the significant 
drawbacks of a motivation test resting on an elusive, if not unreal, distinc- 
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tion allowing removal based on social, political, and moral grounds, but 
forbidding removal “imposing some religious or scientific orthodoxy” 
(Zykan u.Warsaw Community School Corp., 1980). 
Law and common sense requires schools to inculcate values. Some 
years ago, Chief Justice William Rehnquist observed that “of necessity, 
elementary and secondary educators must separate the relevant from the 
irrelevant, the appropriate from the inappropriate” (Board ofEducation u. 
Pico, 1982). A school must inculcate social values, but to do so requires 
selection if not coercion. 
Law condemns “censorship” but also reinforces the authority of educa- 
tors and other public servants to inculcate societal values. This point receives 
no emphasis in the Library Bill of Rights. In Momt u.Hawkins Cip Board OJ 
Education (1987), the Court upheld the right of a public school to require 
pupils to read texts that a parent found offensive to her religon. Noting that 
the required reading did not insist that students declare any belief, the Court 
cited Bethel School District u.Fraser (1986) and observed that public schools 
“serve the purpose of teaching fundamental values ‘essential to a democratic 
society.’ These values ‘include tolerance of divergent political and religious 
views’” (Bethel School District v. Frmq 1986). 
In a similar vein, Walter Dickey, while head of the Wisconsin Divi- 
sion of Corrections, in 1984 cites the importance of prison libraries in 
inculcating values: “[B]ooks have been very important in the develop- 
ment of values that allow one to live at peace with oneself, as well as with 
others” he says. “It follows that books can help offenders in ways that 
they help most people-by helping them form values to live by” (Dickey, 
1994,p. 30).2 Surely all library users, notjust prisoners, can benefit from 
that policy. 
Does a library violate its duties if it excludes books and materials that 
deny the value of tolerance of divergent views (Marcuse, 1965)? Exclu- 
sion may be foolish because such books confirm the existence of bigotry, 
and the public requires education. However, book selections require 
balancing interests. For example, should a public library decline to shelve 
The Turner Diaries (MacDonald, 1980)? The book (apparently a favorite 
of Timothy McVeigh, currently accused of responsibility for the Okla- 
homa City bombing) is rabidly racist, anti-Semitic, and advocates a race 
war. The book supplies a formula for explosives and may have helped 
encourage the persons who bombed the federal building in Oklahoma 
City. Jane Larson, a professor in Northwestern’s Law School, argues that, 
if the bomber made plans based on the book, the author should be civilly 
liable for the harm caused by the book (Landis & Larson, 1995). It sold 
more than 185,000 copies, and its author made quite a bit of money. 
Since its publication in 1980, it remains the Bible of the extreme right 
militia movement. Contents of The TurnerDiaries do not inculcate demo- 
cratic pluralist values; grounds for keeping it out of the reach of the 
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impressionable are easy to perceive. How does one interpret the fact that 
the copy in the University of ~~isconsiii-Madison’s library appears much 
used? 
The Library Bill of Rights does not articulate support for a collec- 
tions policy designed to promote tolerance, representative government, 
and patriotic values. Publishers have a right to publish material contest- 
ing tolerance, rejecting patriotism, offering substitutes for family values, 
or whatever, but it does not follow that the public can require libraries to 
supply that material. Can a library collections policy exclude books that 
offend those values? Can a public library properly decide not to receive 
a gift of books that denigrate people not holding “Christian beliefs?” (Se-
attle Times,1993). First Amendment law does require us to decide whether 
all ideas have equal merit, but the Library Bill of Rights suggests neutral- 
ity. It does not guide us in distinguishing censorship from the promotion 
of values. Neither, for that matter, does the law help us. 
The Pic0 decision (Board oJ‘Educutionu. Pico, 1982), the only Supreme 
Court decision evaluating hbrdry content, remains enigmatic because it pro-
duced no majority opinion-only seven separate views, three from Justices 
in the majority, four from dissenters. After receiving complaints about ob- 
jectionable books, a Long Island school board appointed a committee to 
review books for their educational suitability, good taste, relevance, and ap- 
propriateness. Of the nine books complained about, the committee recom- 
mended the removal of two.--?’he Naked Ape (Morris, 1967) and Down Those 
Mean Streets (Thomas, 1967). Committee members could not agree on Soul 
on Ice (Cleaver, 196’7) and A H m  Ain’t Nothin’ But a Sandwich (Childress, 
1973). They said that readers of Slaughterhouse Five (Vonnegut, 1969) and 
Black Roy (Wright, 1945) required parental approval. 
The school board rejected the advice of the Committee and removed 
all the books, finding them “anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, 
and just plain filthy” (Board of Education u. Pico, 1982). Several students 
sued, claiming a violation of First Amendment freedoms. A District Court 
upheld the removal without holding any trial or hearings, but the Court 
of Appeals reversed. In 1982, the Supreme Court disapproved the re- 
movals but failed to agree on why and remanded for a trial. No trial 
occurred-the parties evidently exhausted. However, the opinion remains 
a centerpiece for discussion of the First Amendment in a library context. 
Five Justices (Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Blackmun, and White) 
ordered a trial. Four of them said that a trial must decide whether the 
removals were for valid politically neutral reasons, or whether the re- 
moval rested on the board’s disagreement with the books’ contents. Jus- 
tice White does not say what a trial must establish. Brennan’s opinion 
for the plurality of four contains contradictions. He admits that a school 
board has discretion to set the content of a public school library, but he 
also says that content decisions must not rest on narrow partisan or politi- 
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cal grounds. “If petitioners intended by their removal decision to 
deny. ..access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed,” he notes, “and if 
this intent was the decisive factor in petitioners’ decision, then petition- 
ers have exercised their discretion in violation of the Constitution” (Board 
oj Education u. Pico, 1982). Brennan says the First Amendment forbids 
orthodoxy, but he also says that schools have a duty to “inculcate funda- 
mental values” (Board of Education u. Pico, 1982). Surely “fundamental 
values” make up an orthodoxy, and in this respectJustice Brennan’s words 
lack coherence. Justice Brennan also said he might approve the removal 
decision if the school showed it “was based solely upon the educational 
suitability of the books.. .”. Book removals for legitimate educational pur- 
poses do not violate the First Amendment. 
The problem, of course, lies in identifying a “legitimate educational 
purpose.” Justice Blackmun takes a more aggressive stance by inviting 
judicial balancing. Courts, he said, should examine all school decisions- 
not simply library decisions-to determine whether a school acts in a 
politically neutral manner. Blackmun does not identify how to achieve a 
neutral balance, nor does he offer a practical solution. In his Pic0 dis-
sent, Chief Justice Warren Burger accurately observes that “virtually all 
educational decisions” involve some political determination (Board o j  
Education u. Pico, 1982). 
The American Library Association emphasizes “freedom to read” but 
to read what? If the publication lacks legal protection-e.g., obscenity-
it is hard to justify freedom to read it. Freedom to read does not imply a 
duty of government to supply the reading material. Just as freedom of 
speech does not generate a correlative duty of government to supply the 
speaker with a printing press, so also freedom to read does not imply a 
government duty to supply any specific reading material. However, in 
Pico,Justice Brennan notes for himself and Justices Marshall and Stevens 
that the “right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the sender’s First 
Amendment right to send them” (Board of Education u. Pico, 1982). But 
the nature of the right claimed depends very much on the context. “The 
special characteristics of the school library,”he says, “make the environ- 
ment especially appropriate for the recognition of the First Amendment 
rights of students” (Board of Education u. Pico, 1982). However, he only 
deals with removal policies, not with the more interesting question of 
what bookshelves should contain. It seems implausible that Justice 
Brennan meant that librarians must honor any student demand to shelve 
any book. 
The “right to receive” has dubious roots in constitutional law. Courts 
uphold restrictions on advertising and sustain laws limiting sexually ex- 
plicit speech and, within limits, retain the law of defamation. Some things 
people have no right to receive even if a speaker has a right to communi- 
cate. Moreover, libraries cannot, practically speaking, include all 
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information. With limited resources, they must choose. Furthermore, 
school libraries have a teaching role-and teaching requires selectivity. 
Decisions that limited the coercive power of government, such as those 
protecting students who refuse to salute the flag, for example, do not 
support a general “right” to information, only a right not to be subjected 
to force that offends political or religious belief. 
Some claim a “right to read” finds support in Cmswold v. Connecticut 
(1965), but that case focuses on the privacy rights of those seeking con- 
traceptives not simply on the First Amendment. The Court has struck 
down rules prohibiting the distribution of handbills from door to door, 
saying that “the First Amendment [protects] freedom [to] distribute lit- 
erature.” But then the Court unnecessarily added that the First Amend- 
ment “protects the right to receive [information]” (Mart in  u. City of 
Struthers, 1943). However, the right to read, or the right to distribute 
literature, does not embody a duty of the government to buy books or to 
help in the distribution of literature. Dean Yudof (1984) correctly ob- 
serves that “the ‘right to know’ ... is no more than artistic camouflage to 
protect the interests of the willing speaker who seeks to communicate 
with a willing listener.” Recent decisions reveal that protection for the 
speaker is tempered by allowing government to protect listeners (Florida 
Bur v. Wentfor It, Inc., 1995). 
Two of the four dissenting Justices in Pico, all of whom wrote force- 
fully, remain on the Court and might today be joined by Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Kennedy in rulings favorable to school administrators. Chief 
Justice Burger, joined byJustices Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, agreed 
that a school board enjoys discretion to select the books in a library. Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Powell expressed dismay over the corrosion of 
school board authority. Justice Powell, a former school board member, 
noted that, in the Pic0 case, the school board took its responsibilities seri- 
ously and tried to decide what values to impart-a task, after all, they 
were elected to do. If the majority in Pic0 means that any junior high 
school student can get ajudge to reverse a book removal decision, Justice 
Powell rightly objects. Powell appended a summary of excerpts from the 
books showing some reason to believe the volumes contain substantial 
racist and/or vulgar words, and therefore, in his view, justified a decision 
to remove. 
In his strong dissent in Pico,Justice Rehnquist stressed the school’s 
interest in determining what the educational program should be, an in- 
terest that encompassed deciding what books to place in a library. School 
board actions are part of many choices that are necessary in the ordinary 
course of their duties. He viewed a school library simply as a supplement 
to a public institution engaged in “the selective conveyance of ideas.” 
Thus, he said, public libraries enjoyed more discretion to exclude be- 
cause the challenged books were generally available. Justice O’Connor 
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took a more measured view of the removal decisions which, on the mer- 
its, she thought wrong. However, she believed the board’s decisions were 
entitled to great deference. 
The Pic0 case presents several problems. How does one measure a 
decision-maker’s purpose? If a school board decides only that “the books 
lack significant educational value,” does a Court have the authority to 
challenge that decision as erroneous? If a school board overrules the 
school faculty, does the Court have authority to prefer the faculty deci- 
sion to that of the elected school board? In several recent cases, the 
Court has sustained seemingly absurd school decisions because the ac- 
tors held administrative authority. Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in 
Pic0 does not deny administrative decision making. Where evidence of a 
political motivation appears debatable, one can expect courts to favor 
the administrators unless they find a constitutional violation. In 1968, 
the Court protected a teacher’s freedom in a classroom, preferring the 
right to teach evolutionary biology over a legislative ban on such teach- 
ing (E@~son u. Arkansas, 1968). Twenty years later, however, the Court 
approved the censorship imposed by a school on a student newspaper 
which school officials found invaded the privacy of other students 
(Hazelwood School Dist. u. Kuhlmeier, 1988), and a lower court allowed re- 
moval of a text containing Chaucer’s Miller’s Tale (Virgil u. School Bd. of 
Columbia Co., 1988). In short, Pic0 does not mean much. 
Limited resources force choice. Does law limit that discretion? At 
the extremes, the boundaries appear clear. A social science library may 
not properly collect mathematics or physics books and vice versa. Selec-
tivity requires judgment, but the Library Bill of Rights supplies no practi- 
cal guidance. Justice Stevens observed the necessity for choice in Widmar 
u. Vincent (1981): 
In performing their learning and teaching missions, the managers of a 
university routinely make countless decisions based on the consent of 
communicative materials. They select books for inclusion in the library, 
they hire professors on the basis of their academic philosophies, they 
select courses for inclusion in the curriculum, and they reward scholars 
for what they have written ...if two groups of 25 students requested the 
use of a room at a particular time-one to view Mickey Mouse cartoons 
and the other to rehearse an amateur performance of Hamlet-the 
First Amendment would not require that the room be reserved for the 
group that submitted its application first. 
Of course, if a public library purporting to offer its patrons a general 
selection of popular writing decided not to include books written by Re- 
publicans, by minority authors, by Catholics, etc., such a policy would 
offend the First Amendment because it would be based on the racial, 
political, or religious views of the government decision maker (see Widmar 
u. Tiincent, 1981). These actions are particularized viewpoint discriminations 
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and hence fatal to the policy. Happily, one is unlikely to encounter such 
clearly unlawful policies. 
The Library Bill of Rights overgeneralizes. To consider “all people” 
as target patrons constitutes a large, if not impossible, audience to satisQ. 
If a community shows no interest in authors of a particular background 
and viewpoint, a library wastes its resources in purchasing materials no 
one reads. A homogeneous community might be easy to satisfy. A larger 
heterogeneous group offers more varieties of users than a library can 
practically serve. The community may contain the mentally ill, criminals, 
and perverts, but no one seriously suggests that libraries must accommo- 
date the special interests of such people. To say that “materials should 
not be excluded because of the origin, background or views of those con- 
tributing to their creation” promises a lot but delivers very little. A book 
selector might simply say that the materials “lack educational value,” or 
“patrons would have little interest in this,” or “we think better (or cheaper) 
materials are available.” It is not hard to dress a decision in nonpolitical 
terms to mask politics and moral sensibilities. Prison libraries may ex- 
clude books on lock picking or materials suggesting how to make explo- 
sives. Why not allow a forthright policy barring books with unsocial oh- 
jectives from such collections? The breadth of the Library Bill of Rights 
invites masking decisions. 
Can a library properly exclude material that appears to be the prod- 
uct of alcoholism, mental illness, perversion, or crime? That policy might 
exclude the works of the Marquis de Sade, Dylan Thomas, Samuel 
Coleridge, Francois Villon, or Richard Nixon. But it might also happily 
exclude works lacking taste, vitality, or redeeming value. Framing a policy 
in neutral terms presents a drafting problem, but a policy to exclude books 
on the grounds of obscenity or vulgarity passes (Thomas u. Board of Educa-
tion, 19’79; Frison u. Franklin County Board of Education, 1979; Brubakrr u. 
Board of Education, 1974). Moreover, a school library serving young chil- 
dren may exclude sexually explicit materials, even if the materials passed 
the constitutional test of “obscenity” (Bicknrllu. Verfennes Union High School 
Board, 1980). 
The Library Bill of Rights promises too much by requiring material 
reflecting “all points of view.” Library patrons may lack interest in “all 
points of view” even if resources for all viewpoints were available. If a 
library subscribes to Playboy, must it also take Penthouse or Hustler? A law 
library might decide only to stock Penthouse because Harvard’s Professor 
Alan Dershowitz writes a regular column for it, but I expect that decision, 
at least here in Wisconsin, might inspire objection. 
Distinguishing “partisan” and “doctrinal” disapproval (bad) from 
decisions based on taste, relevance, and general policy (good) can rest 
on subjective factors. The matter of gay-lesbian-bisexual interests trig- 
gers public pressures particularly from groups that believe homosexual 
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conduct immoral. Can a school library lawfully decide not to select Heather 
has Two Mommies (Newman, 1989) or Daddy k Roommate (Willhoite, 1990)? 
Given the vast amount of literature seeking a place in a children’s 
library, a decision to prefer more conventional classics may be under- 
standable. In Blacksburg, Virginia, the library board kept Daddy’s Room- 
mate on the shelf by a divided vote (Roanoke Timev €3 World News, 1994). 
Would a decision not to purchase the book in the first place inspire ob- 
jection or trigger a violation of the Library Bill of Rights? Purchasing 
decisions do not invite legal review. The case for including either or 
both volumes in a children’s collection rests on the fact that some par- 
ents present a child with a situation that may be hard to explain. Inclu- 
sion may rest on the belief that a work of fiction may more accurately 
explain a situation that a child finds unusual. However, if a book selec- 
tion policy declined to shelve books explaining gay/lesbian relationships, 
courts probably would not interfere. 
Paragraph three of the Library Bill of Rights invites conflict without 
regard to seriousness or wisdom. Does it mean that libraries should chal- 
lenge every critic? Paragraph four urges cooperation with “all.” Might 
that not also invite broad and inadvisable alliances? To the extent the 
Library Bill of Rights invites unnecessary confrontation, it appears too 
spacious if not foolish. Evidently, the library board in Loudoun County, 
Virginia, thought very much the same when, in February 1995, it decided 
to substitute portions of the Library Bill of Rights for a less sweeping 
policy favoring free expression. The controversy began with a concern 
for the policies for selecting library books and raises the question whether 
the Library Bill of Rights promises more than any library board can de- 
liver. By a 4 to 3 margin, the Library Board of Trustees in this far subur- 
ban Washington, DC, community voted to delete some of the anticensor- 
ship language in the Library Bill of Rights including the following por- 
tions: “Materials should not be proscribed removed because of partisan 
or doctrinal disapproval”; “Libraries should challenge censorship in the 
fulfillment of their responsibility to provide information and enlighten- 
ment”; “Libraries should cooperate with all persons and groups concerned 
with resisting abridgement of free expression and free access to ideas.” 
Expressing further uneasiness after several citizens cited fears of censor- 
ship, the board replaced the deleted anticensorship language with the state- 
ment “censorship of ideas should be rejected and opposed,” then titled the 
resulting document-which consists of a set of “propositions”-“Freedom 
for Ideas-Freedom from Censorship.” One Board member explained her 
vote to replace by saying that she could not honor the Library Bill of Rights 
because it might require her to work with “groups like the Ku Klux Klan, and 
Ijust cannot do that” (The Wnshing-ton Post, 1995). 
In 1969, the Supreme Court ruled that words inciting violence en- 
joyed First Amendment protection unless they threatened likely and 
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imminent harm. Taken seriously, the Brandenburg doctrine (which the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed) protects a wide variety of words 
including those soliciting the commission of murder (Brandenburgu. Ohio, 
1969). Thus, in Eimanm u.Soldier of Fortune Magazine (1989), the court 
reversed a $9.4 million judgment against the magazine after a jury found 
that an advertisement seeking “high risk assignments” led to a contract 
killing. The court found insufficient evidence of the magazine’s negli- 
gence in not foreseeing the homicide. The court cited, but did not ex- 
plicitly rely upon, First Amendment doctrine. 
However, in Braun u. Soldier of Fortune Magazine (1992), the court 
sustained liability of the magazine and explicitly rejected a First Amend- 
ment defense. In this case the advertisement said: “Gun for Hire: 37 year- 
old professional mercenary desires jobs ....Discreet and very private ....All 
jobs considered.” A reader hired the advertiser who then performed a 
contract killing. The victim’s sons succeeded in getting a jury verdict of 
$12.37 million against the magazine. In upholding the verdict on ap- 
peal, the Court of Appeals ruled that “the First Amendment permits a 
state to impose upon a publisher liability for compensatory damages for 
negligently publishing a commercial advertisement where the ad on its 
face, and without the need for investigation, makes it apparent that there 
is a substantial danger of harm to the public” (Braun u. Soldier of For- 
tune Magazine, 1993). 
Although the decision may have subsequently led the advertising 
manager to act more judiciously, Soldier of Fortune continues to engage in 
warrior worship. Should libraries subscribe? It contains material of inter- 
est to mostly male readers, but should librarians keep it off open shelves? 
One can only speculate why, as of this writing, at least three Wisconsin 
libraries keep back issues in locked cases. 
Does one condemn a library for deciding not to purchase the expen- 
sive ($49.95) but salacious book Sex by Madonna (1992)? The book comes 
close to pornography-it certainly depicts amorous and athletic action. 
Many describe it as “trash,” yet librarians report heavy demand, long wait- 
ing lists and, in some communities, fierce complaints about its presence 
(see Kniffel, 1992). The public library in Des Moines, Iowa, classified it 
as “reference/fine arts” thus confirming the observation that “one man’s 
vulgarity is another’s lyric” (Cohen u. CaZ$ornia, 1971). Other libraries 
faced a more vocal and critical audience. An Arizona library ordered the 
book, but the town mayor, who evidently held the power of decision, 
asked that the order be cancelled. Shortly thereafter the library received 
three gift copies. Should it accept the gifts? The Library Bill of Rights 
supplies no guidance. 
A decision not to shelve Madonna’s Sex, regardless of the existence 
of objection, seems defensible. The book is costly, and although it re-
veals the female body (a display that is hardly novel), one would be hard 
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pressed to say that it contributes to society’s store of knowledge. Yet the 
waiting list of borrowers attests to its entertainment value. Is it worth the 
cost? Public libraries depend on public support, and resisting pressure 
incurs a cost which may vary from place to place and from book to book. 
Madison, Wisconsin, may tolerate, or even applaud, Madonna, but Amy 
Hielsberg (1994) accurately observes that many in this renowned “lib- 
eral” community may not so easily accept American Psycho (Ellis, 1991). 
Charges of engaging in “political correctness” can easily be leveled 
against some library decisions. To remove The Story of Little Black Sambo 
(Bannerman, 1899) but not a book depicting police as pigs, reveals “po- 
litical correctness” in virulent form. Should public libraries adopt a policy 
against shelving books that are “factually incorrect?” For example, some 
argue that the Holocaust never occurred, that some people have invented 
a belief that Nazi Germany exterminated millions of Jews, the mentally 
unfit, and others (Gypsies, homosexuals, etc.). That is an easily refuted 
point of view. However, a publication denying the reality of the Holo- 
caust exists-The Journal of Historical Review. Should a library with scarce 
resources subscribe? 
The “factual correctness” standard generates problems. Who decides 
correctness? Some years ago, a Catholic librarian, who excluded a Prot- 
estant text on the basis of factual correctness, inspired the American Li- 
brary Association to delete the truth standard from the Library Bill of 
Rights. However, that standard has value in other contexts. Because The 
Encyclopedia of Mushrooms (Dickinson 8c Lucas, 1979) contains erroneous 
information on edibility, several people who followed its advice became 
sick as a result and, although they all recovered, all needed liver trans- 
plants (see Winter v. G. €? Putnam’s Sons, 1991). Should a library purchase 
this book knowing it contains incorrect information that can lead to the 
death of a library patron? If there was only one error in the book, a 
correction might be added, but who knows? 
It is absurd to require a library faced with scarce or inadequate re- 
sources to satisfy mushroom hunters or Holocaust deniers. Of course, if 
the dispute becomes a matter of significant local debate, a library’s deci- 
sion to include erroneous materials in contrast with more accurate works 
may be more understandable, but that decision should rest on sound 
discretion, not in the Library Bill of Rights. 
Paragraph five of the Library Bill of Rights forbids discrimination 
because of youth, Constitutional law does not. The interests of educators 
require special treatment and sometimes burdens on the young. Is it 
realistic to deny librarians the right to assist parents who wish (wisely or 
foolishly) to limit the access of their children to certain library materials? 
ALA standards clearly say that parents, and only parents, have this au-
thority to deny. Librarians should not stand as parental substitutes, the 
association says. A Maryland public library proposes issuing restrictive 
24 LIBFURY TRENDS/SUMMER 1996 
library cards preventing .juvenile borrowers from checking out certain 
books without parental authority. Courts may uphold such a restrictive 
card. Is the Library Bill of Rights realistic in refusing to support parents 
who wish assistance in limiting access (see WashingtonPost, 1994)? Gov-
ernment policies regularly reinforce the authority of parents, yet the Li- 
brary Bill of Rights advocates say that children should not be considered 
“second class citizens.” The Fact remains, however, that they are second 
class citizens, and courts regularly uphold restrictions on the young that 
do not apply to the mature. 
Recent decisions consistently and predominantly prefer the interests 
of teachers and administrators over the claims of students. In Vernonia 
School District v. Acton (1995), the Court upheld the reasonableness of 
requiring high school athletes to undergo drug tests. The majority noted 
that “traditionally at common law, and still today, unemancipated minors 
lack some of the most fundamental rights of self-determination ....They 
are subject, even as to their physical freedom, to the control of their par- 
ents or guardians.” In 1985, the Supreme Court telegraphed this view in 
N mJersey v. 7:L.0. 
Freedom claims of student9 collide with those of school teachers and 
administrators because those charged with the task of educating hold au- 
thority to “inculcate the habits and manners of civility” (BethelSchoolDistm’ct 71. 
Fraser, 1986). In the Fraser decision, the Court upheld disciplinary action 
against a high school student who delivered an off-color graduating ceremony 
speech to classmates. School officials can regulate student speech and may 
censor school-sponsored publications where that censorship reasonably re- 
lates to legitimate educational concerns (Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeiu, 
1988). Within the realm of reason, the Court not only upholds corporal 
punishment (Inpaham u. Wright,1977),it also requires few procedural rights 
to precede discipline ( Gos,su. Lopez, 1975). Earlier decisions upholding the 
rights of students over those of administrators appear less compelling and 
clearly distinguishable. Tinkerv. Des MoinesIndqbendent CommunzqSchool Dist. 
(1969) narrowly upheld the right of pupils to wear black armbands as a sign 
of protest, but the majority noted that the symbol did not threaten good 
order and discipline. 
The Library Bill of Rights does not displace the lawful administrative 
authority of a public body charged with making library policy. Thus it 
offers no protection to a library employee who defies the authority of a 
lawful decision maker. When that authority involves spending public 
money, courts show great reluctance to displace adminis trativejudgments. 
An Illinois public library director in 1994 ordered a library window ex- 
hibit removed over the objection of subordinates. The display contained 
a collage ofclippings, photos, and literature on adoption rights and cov- 
ered the controversial “Baby Richard” case which took a child from a 
couple holding adoptive custody and preferred the biological parents. 
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Although the subordinate who created the display objected, the director 
acted legally because her decision, like that of an editor, rests on her 
administrative authority. Courts normally do not displace the rights of 
an authorized superior. An employee of a government agency must fol- 
low lawful orders (Bicknellu. Vergennes Union High School Board, 1980). For 
example, in 1979, Utah county discharged a library director for refusal to 
remove a book but, in due course and after considerable expense, she 
was vindicated (see Krug & Harvey, 1992; Layton v. Swapp, 19’79). In this 
setting, it appeared that the library director held legal authority and acted 
within that authority. 
CONCLUSION 
Mark Twain observes: “It is by the goodness of God that in our coun- 
try we have those three unspeakable precious things: freedom of speech, 
freedom of conscience, and the prudence never to practice either of them” 
(Bartlett, 1992, p. 527). His meaning is clear-it is impossible to main- 
tain a civil society where all people fully exercise their rights uninhibited 
by self-restraint. Without forbearance, self discipline, and good manners, 
no community can flourish. 
~ J O T E S  
Rule 2.1 of the Supreme Court of the United States provides that the Court’s library “will 
be open to the appropriate personnel of this Court, members of the Bar of this Court, 
Members of Congress, members of their legal staffs, arid attorneys for the United States, 
its departments and agencies.” 

In Hazelwood School Dist. u. Kuhlmeiw, 1988, Justice White’s majority opinion emphasized 

the responsibility of schools to inculcate values which allowed a school to ceiisor a news-

paper produced in ajournalism class. 
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